From Evil Others to Evil Elites, Campion-Vincent, Veronique
‘From Evil Others to Evil Elites’ Campion-Vincent, Veronique in ‘Rumor Mills: The Social Impact of Rumour and Legend’ (eds: Fine, Gary Alan; Campion-Vincent, Veronique; Heath, Chip), Aldine Transaction, Somerset, N. J., 2005, ISBN 0202307468
p. 103 - Campion-Vincent claims that, historically, CTs were an expression of fear of the outsider(s) subverting national identity and that such theories enhanced communal identity.
p. 103-4 - ‘Conspiracy Theories today can also be considered a folk social science or folk history, as a “subculture of intellectual dissent” (Eliason 1996 [Eliason, Eric. 1996. “Conspiracy Theories.” Pp. 157-55 in American Folklore. An Encyclopedia, edited by Jan Harold Brunvald. New York/London: Garland.]), aiming, as do academic treatises, to provide meaningful and accurate explanations of the world’s condition. Conspiracy thinking is part of an everyday struggle to make sense of a rapidly changing world. This interpretative approach is well defined by the expression “contemporary mythologies” suggested by Ellis, who defines them as “scenarios made up of many beliefs and narratives which are accepted on faith and used then to link and give meaning to stressful events” (2000:5 [Ellis, Bill. 2000. Raising the Devil. Satanism, New Religions and the Media. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky]). These theories provide “a conspiratorial sense of being the victim of invisible and indefatigable forces [that] is an everyday attitude in many countries” (Knight 2002:7 [Knight, Peter. 2002. “Introduction.” Pp. 1-17 in Conspiracy Nation. The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America, edited by Peter Knight. New York/London: New York University Press.]) increasingly affected by gobalization.
‘Conspiracies are deeply rooted in the social fabric, tied to power and secrecy.’
p. 104 - ‘Contemporary conspiracies remain possible and plausible, but are never proven. In their modern acceptance, conspiracies are characterized by their utopian aim as they attempt to create (or oppose) “a new society for a new man” (ibid.:9 [Poulat, Emile. 1992. “L’esprit du complot.” Politica Hermetica, Special Issue, Le Complot 6:6-12.]).’
p. 104-5 - ‘The Internal Logic of Conspiracy Theories
‘In some ways, the surge of conspiracy theories seems paradoxial as it coincides with an increased complexity of society. When power was concerntrated in a few hands, plots could be effective. Such is not the case today when “power flows, changes hands, and affects oponion, which no one controls and no represents entirely” (Graumann 1987a:vii [Graumann, Carl F. 1987. “Preface.” Pp vii-ix in Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, Springer Series in Social Psychology, edited by C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. New York: Springer Verlag.]). Yet, the paradox is only apparent, as these conspiracy theories help to cope with the uncertainty accompanying this complexity. Looking for an explanation for a nonroutine important public event, people adopt conspiracy stories that present a set of cognitive attributes:
‘1. A specific agent(s) is named, with a clear motivation.
‘2. The agent is evil, the outcome is destructive, which is easy to understand—evil results in evil—and not a complicated and probably more accurate explanation of complex events with unintended consequences of multiple intersecting agents and actions.
‘3. The evil agent has the capacity for some big event—controls important resources, acts united or with powerful allies, does it in secret, and thus nobody stops it.
‘4. Conspiracies sometimes do happen, and everyone agrees that they have at times.
‘5. Some learned, respected, prominent people, not just ignorant marginal people, promote the conspiracy theory—they may be self-serving, but they cannot be ignored (Anthony Oberschall, personal communication, October 19, 2003).’
p. 105 - ‘Social psychologists and historians (Graumann and Moscovici 1987 [Graumann, Carl F. and Moscovici, Serge (Eds.). 1987. Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy [Springer Series in Social Psychology]. New York: Springer Verlag.]) have emphasized the psychological benefits of conspiracy theories in reducing uncertainty. Conspiracy theories describe intentional agency as the root of social movement and change. In a state of crisis in which the established value system of a group or society seems at stake, it is easier to cope with anxiety if it becomes fear of someone who can be held responsible. This enemy is camouflaged and masqueraded into normal and inoffensive character. Those who have discovered the conspiracy must fight “both the malice of the conspirator and the ignorance and disbelief of their own group” (Graumann 1987b:247-48 [Graumann, Carl F. 1987. “Conspiracy: History and Social Pyschology—A Synopsis.” Pp. 245-51 in Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy, Springer Series in Social Psychology, edited by C. F. Graumann and S. Moscovici. New York: Springer Verlag.]). Embracing conspiracy theories often implies a commitment to a group of counter-conspirators: “The image of a devilish plot has as [its] opposite that of the holy conspiracy” (Girardet 1986:16 [Girardet, Raoul. 1986. Mythes et mythologies politiques. Paris: Seuil.]). The enemy is organised, not an individual, but a dark power.’
p. 105 - ‘Conspiracy theories reduce uncertainty in proclaiming a mechanical and linear causality, dismissing all reference to randomness or chance. Adopting conspiracy theories seems to furnish a universal password: why try to explain the meaning of events through complex historical, psychological, or sociological inquiries, when a direct cause can be supported.’
p. ‘The negation of randomness and chance that marks conspiracy theories seems almost justified when the “contingency theory” that stresses the role of chance and accident in many events is rejected as a social fantasy negating the antagonisms that really split society: “Contingency theory maintains the existing capitalist system by attributing any deviations from the social equilibrium to chance and accident rather the immanent social antagonisms or contradictions” (Willman 2002:28 [Willman, Skip. 2002. “Spinning Paranoia: The Ideologies of Conspiracy and Contingency in Postmodern Culture.” Pp. 21-39 in Conspiracy Nation. The Politics of Paranoia in Postwar America, edited by Peter Knight. New York/London: New York University Press.]).’
