All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Steve Clarke, ‘Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing’ in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32 No. 2, June 2002 131-150

p. 131 - Compares CTs to Creationism and Astrology (on the next page he says CTs can be true whilst we wouldn’t say that Astrology and Creationism are true).

p. 132 - ‘No doubt history plays its part in explaining the hostility of intellectuals toward conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theorizing has long been favored by Populists, who are almost invariably antielitist, and therefore generally anti-intellectual as well. Some intellectuals may dismiss conspiracy theories simply on the basis of guilt by association with anti-intellectual Populism.’

p. 135-6 - ‘Conspiracy theories invariably seem to be based on more evidence than their immediate rival, the nonconspiratorial “received view.” This is because they explain all that the nonconspiratorial received view explains—the apparent plausibility of the nonconspiratorial received view is a consequence of the success of the cover story or cover-up, according to conspiracy theorists—and then go on to account for evidence that the received view is unable to explain. Once a conspiracy theorist has become committed to a conspiracy theory, she is able to account for almost any relevant evidence that is presented. It is either evidence of the cover-up, which the conspirers are attempting, or it is evidence of discrepancies in the received explanation. Strictly, none of this can be described as ad hoc. A theory that involves an attempt by some people to deceive other people is a theory that involves reasons both to expect a cover-up and flaws in the cover-up.’
(Falsificationism. errant data and aggregation.)

p. 136 - Reference to CTs as LRPs.

p. 137 - Whilst giving up on a dLRP could be seen as bad for a scientist Clarke argues that a CT researcher giving up on their dLRP could only be good for them, socially.

p. 140 - ‘Keeley’s first charge against conspiracy theories is not at all telling. Keeley is right that social data is generally less reliable than the data that natural scientists locate, but he fails to inform us as to why this consideration should tell particularly against the errant data that conspiracy theories explain. It appears to be a consideration that tells equally against all social data. Furthermore, it is very hard to see how this could be a consideration that tells against errant data more than against nonerrant data. Errant data is only errant in relation to an accepted theory, and to discount errant data on grounds that apply to both errant and nonerrant data would be to prejudice oneself in favor of data simply because it happens to be explained by the received theory.‘
(Public/institutional trust and social data.)

p. 141 - ‘Consider how the Watergate conspiracy might be adapted to embrace skepticism as far reaching as skepticism about the taxonomic status of the platypus: in his increasingly paranoid state of mind, Nixon became convinced that the platypuses’ taxonomic status disposed voters in favor of the Democratic Party, and so he ordered Gordon Liddy to interfere with the documentation of basic science so as to have the platypus falsely taxonomized. I take it that it is clear that no actual version of the Watergate conspiracy involves such allegations or allegations remotely like these. Indeed it is hard to see that any of the conspiracy theories Keeley contemplates have the effect of undermining very entrenched mundane beliefs.’
(Doesn’t seem to be taking Keeley’s point onboard; Keeley thinks that UCT skepticism will entail a general skepticism of socially obtained data, not that the UCT will directly lead to specific skepticism.)

p. 141 - Slippery slopes are not unique to CTs.

p. 141 - Clarke argues that we should expect conspiring agents to be more reliable than non-conspiring agents on matters outside the conspiracy (i.e. building up trust).

p. 142 - Clarke characterises CTs as LRP rather than just explanations. Argues against Keeley here, who characterises them as explanations. All to do with the term ‘theory.’

p. 143 - ‘The factor that I have identified as being common to the thinking of conspiracy theorists who hold on to degenerating research programs is that they commit what social psychologists call the “fundamental attribution error.”’

p. 144 - ‘According to many social psychologists, humans systematically make the error of severely overestimating the importance of dispositional factors, as well as the concomitant error of severely underestimating the importance of situational factors, when seeking to understand and explain the behavior of others. This error is both very widespread and of a significant magnitude. Social psychologists have marshaled compelling evidence in favor of its existence.’
(Fundamental Attribution Error)

p. 145 - ‘As explanations, conspiracy theories are highly dispositional. When conspiracies occur it is because conspirators intend them to occur and act on their intentions. The conspiratorial dispositions of the conspirators play the role of the cause in a typical explanation that involves a conspiracy. In most cases, the received view, the conventionally accepted nonconspiratorial alternative to a particular conspiracy theory, is a situational explanation.’
(Characteristics of a CT.)

p. 146 - ‘If you believe that the U.S. military leadership are reluctant to discuss the Roswell Incident because there is no such incident to discuss, you are basing your belief on a situational factor. By contrast, if you believe that the U.S. military leadership are conspiring to keep the public unaware of contact with alien species, which occurred at Roswell, New Mexico, you would presumably explain the U.S. military leadership’s persistent denials of knowledge of the incident by appealing to their disposition toward conspiratorial paternalistic behavior.’

p. 146 - ‘Of course, the proponents of a conspiracy theory will not simply feel that a dispositional conspiracy theory is better than its nonconspiratorial situational alternative despite its degeneration; they will make efforts to rationalize their preference. One way they can do this is by appealing to the unifying power of conspiracy theories. Dispositional explanations, such as conspiratorial explanations, can appear to exhibit more unifying power than situational explanations, because dispositional explanations can relate the occurrence of events within the context of an intended plan. Because conspiracy theories typically involve highly elaborate plans, they will usually exhibit great unificatory power. Situations, by contrast, can appear to be “one off” events, and explanations appealing to them can appear to lack unificatory power. But this contrast is fallacious. If you examine the circumstances of Elvis Presley’s natural death closely enough you will be able to relate it to other natural events, and with sufficient persistence you will be able to relate all of these within the scope of physics, thereby furnishing yourself with an explanation with more unificatory power than any dispositional explanation can provide.’

p. 147 - ‘The fundamental attribution error primarily occurs when we make judgments about the behavior of people outside contexts of familiarity.’