All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Coady, David, Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories in ‘Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate,’ (Editor: David Coady), Ashgate, Hampshire, England, 2006

p. 116-7 - ‘What is a conspiracy theory?

‘Keeley’s definition of ‘a conspiracy theory’, which is accepted by Clarke, occurs in the following passage:

‘A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons-the conspirators-acting in secret.5

‘This definition does not quite capture the ordinary usage of the expression ‘conspiracy theory’.
‘First, the requirement that the number of conspirators be relatively small is quite counterintuitive. 6 Many conspiracy theories, including those discussed by Keeley and Clarke, postulate vast networks of conspirators. Indeed it is natural to think that a conspiracy theory according to which there are many conspirators is ipso facto more of a conspiracy theory than one which postulates fewer conspirators. Someone who believed that absolutely everyone else was plotting against her would, I suggest, be a conspiracy theorist par excellence.
‘A more significant problem with the KeeIey/Clarke definition is that it lacks any requirement of success. An explanation of the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of the significant causal agency of the failed conspiracy by the communist old guard to overthrow Gorbachev in 1991 (to borrow an example Pigden uses to slightly different effect) is unlikely to be thought of as a conspiracy theory, because the conspiracy in question did not aim to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Keeley’s definition could easily be modified to accommodate this by requiring that the alleged conspiracy be intended to bring about the historical event in question.
‘Even a definition that is modified in this way, however, still seems too broad to capture our shared concept of a conspiracy theory (insofar as we have one). Take the events of September 11th, 2001. I assume that most people, or at least most people reading this article, accept an explanation of these events that appeals to the significant causal agency of a conspiracy involving Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda to bring about those events. But this explanation is unlikely to attract the label ‘conspiracy theory’.’ Why does it seem wrong to call ‘our’ explanation of September 11th, despite its obviously conspiratorial nature, ‘a conspiracy theory’?
‘We could say that it is not a conspiracy theory, because it is not a theory at all; rather it is a fact. Sometimes the term ‘theory’ is used in a way that is roughly synonymous with ‘unsubstantiated hypothesis’. In this sense, mere theories are contrasted with facts. Conspiracy theories, in this sense, are unwarranted, because all theories are by definition unwarranted.
‘But, obviously, no interesting debate about the epistemic status of conspiracy theories will use the term ‘theory’ in this way; a way that prejudges the issue. Nor should we suppose that the many intellectuals who have a dismissive attitude toward conspiracy theories think that the problem with them is that they are just theories. Intellectuals of all kinds are accustomed to taking theories very seriously.
‘We would do better to define ‘theory’ as ‘a postulated explanation of an empirical phenomenon’.’ Theories, in this sense, cover an epistemic spectrum, from those that are so well-confirmed, such as the theory that the earth revolves around the sun or the theory of evolution by natural selection, that no well-educated, sane, and intellectually honest person will doubt them (outside a philosophy classroom), to those at the other end of the spectrum which are so incredible, such as the theory that Elvis Presley is still alive, that no well-educated, sane, and intellectually honest person will accept them.
‘Conspiracy theories can be found at both ends of this spectrum, as well as at various points in between. Holocaust denial is one, unfortunately widespread, example of a conspiracy theory at the latter end of the spectrum, and critics of conspiracy theories are often keen to cite this as a paradigm of conspiracy theorizing. But in doing so, they often seem to forget that the Holocaust itself was largely brought about by conspiratorial behavior. Both Holocaust acceptance and Holocaust denial fit the Keeley/Clarke definition of a conspiracy theory.
‘These examples suggest that the most important feature missing from the Keeley/Clarke definition is the requirement that a conspiracy theory conflict with an official explanation of the event in question. Consequently, I recommend the following three-part definition:

‘A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of an historical event, in which conspiracy (i.e., agents acting secretly in concert) has a significant causal role. Furthermore, the conspiracy postulated by the proposed explanation must be a conspiracy to bring about the historical event which it purports to explain. Finally, the proposed explanation must conflict with an ‘official’ explanation of the same historical event.
‘The last part of this definition rules out the possibility of an official explanation of an event qualifying as a conspiracy theory, no matter how conspiratorial it is.‘
[Critique of Keeley’s definition of a CT and Coady’s version of the definition.]

p. 119 - ‘ Keeley and Clarke are wrong, however, to claim that conspiracy theories always attempt to explain more than the received alternative does. Conspiracy theories do tend to offer putative explanations of data unexplained by, or apparently in conflict with, the received alternative. But the received alternative will also (unless it is a transparent fabrication) attempt to explain data unexplained by, or apparently in conflict with, its conspiratorial rivals. Gerald Posner’s book Case Closed, for example, (a defense of the received, official, non-conspiratorial account of the assassination of JFK, roughly that provided by the Warren Commission) is filled with data which popular conspiracy theories of the assassination do not even attempt to explain. 17 In other words, it is errant data in relation to those conspiracy theories. For example, according to the Warren Commission’s version of this event Oswald fired a total of three shots. But some witnesses claimed to have heard more than three shots. Conspiratorial accounts of the assassination will typically seek to explain this data, which is errant in relation to the official account. But in doing so, they invariably create their own errant data. For example, about 88 per cent of the almost two hundred witnesses to the assassination said that they heard exactly three shots. This is errant data with respect to most popular conspiracy theories of the assassination, including that of Oliver Stone.’
[Errant data used for both CTs and official versions.]

p. 121 - ‘Of course, we should be careful not to exaggerate the similarities between conspiracy theories and skeptical hypotheses. Although some skeptical hypotheses involve an actual conspiracy, some do not. Descartes’s evil demon is a deceiver so powerful that he has no need for co-conspirators, and therefore no need to conspire. Another difference between conspiracy theories and traditional skeptical hypotheses, is that the former are typically believed by those who devise them, whereas the latter typically are not. Skeptical hypotheses are not usually seriously advocated as explanations; rather their role is to challenge us to explain why we should prefer our commonsense view of the world to the alleged possibility described by the hypothesis. A third difference between skeptical hypotheses and conspiracy theories is that they challenge different sources of epistemic warrant. The former typically challenge our faith in our senses, whereas the latter challenge our faith in the testimony of others, especially the testimony of people and institutions in positions of authority.23’
[Skepticism vs. CTs (as not being similar)]

p. 122 - ‘Keeley and Wilson may admit all this but insist that their point is not that Holocaust Revisionists actually tend to be radical skeptics, but just that their views entail radical skepticism, an entailment that they may or may not recognize. I don’t agree. As noted, a conspiracy theory, unlike a skeptical hypothesis, is offered as an actual explanation, not as an alternative possible explanation. The radical conspiracy theorist seeks not to undermine belief as such, but to replace our current beliefs with different beliefs. Although Holocaust Revisionism is a conspiracy theory that is unwarranted (and false), it is not unwarranted because it is a conspiracy theory. As I remarked earlier, the Holocaust itself was to a large extent brought about by conspiracy. Although here and now belief in the Holocaust does not qualify as a conspiracy theory, because it also has official status, there was a time and place (i.e., Nazi occupied Europe) in which what would now be called ‘Holocaust Revisionism’ was the official story, and belief in the Holocaust was belief in an accurate conspiracy theory. To believe in the Holocaust was to deny the official story that the Jews were merely being resettled.’
[Holocaust example as how CTs can become mainstream history.]

p. 123 - ‘This brings me to Keeley’s final criticism of conspiracy theories; that they are motivated by the Cartesian superstition that significant events cannot have insignificant causes; or, as Descartes put it, there must be at least as much reality in the cause of an event as in the event itself. Keeley portrays conspiracy theorists as people who fail to recognize that sometimes ‘Shit happens’. They cannot, for example, accept that someone as fundamentally insignificant as Lee Harvey Oswald could, acting alone, have caused a major historical event. Keeley suggests that once we free ourselves from the natural but false supposition that important events cannot have unimportant causes we will no longer see a problem here.
‘This is an insightful point that goes a long way towards explaining the enduring popularity of many conspiracy theories, especially those surrounding the assassinations of powerful people. But, as Pigden pointed out, some years before in response to Karl Popper’s criticisms of conspiracy theorizing, this same superstition can lead to the unwarranted downplaying of the importance of conspiracy, as much as it can lead to the unwarranted exaggeration of the significance of conspiracy, in historical explanation. The October revolution of 1917 cannot be understood without reference to conspiratorial behavior. Nonetheless, for many Marxists, mere conspiracy seems too trivial to play the role of the cause of such an important event. This has led them to downplay the importance of conspiracies by Lenin, Trotsky, and the German High Command; portraying the revolution instead as the result of a spontaneous popular uprising.26
‘Although a conspiracy will tend to seem more significant than an individual acting alone, and therefore more appealing as an explanation of a significant historical event (for those in the grip of the Cartesian superstition), a mass movement, or an inevitable historic process, seems more significant than either. The Cartesian superstition therefore seems likely to lead people to deny the importance of conspiracy when they should affirm it, just as often as it will lead them to affirm the importance of conspiracy when they should deny it.’
[Critique of the Cock-up Theory of History]

p. 125 - ‘The problem is not just that there is insufficient evidence for the existence of the fundamental attribution error, it is that belief in the phenomenon is itself deeply paradoxical. Those who say there is a widespread tendency to commit the fundamental attribution error themselves seem to be committing that very error. After all, if we do exaggerate the importance of dispositions in our explanations of behaviour as DarIey, Batson, Clarke and others suggest, this is itself a disposition, which purports to explain a great deal of our behaviour. The more we explain by appeal to the fundamental attribution error, the more we will ourselves be committing the fundamental attribution error. Belief in the fundamental attribution error appears to be self-refuting, in much the same way that naïve set theory and logical positivism are.’
[Critique of the Fundamental Attribution Error]