All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Lee Basham, Malevolent Global Conspiracy in JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 34 No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 91–103.

[Seems to be a revision of his earlier paper...]

p. 91 - ‘Imagine we’re told select members of the Council on Foreign Relations and a consortium of satellite groups are the secret malevolent masters of the planet. As properly reason-obsessed philosophers we probably assume our laughter is grounded in rational epistemology. We believe that it’s an easy task to show that the most ambitious conspiracy theories, malevolent global conspiracy theories, are utterly unwarranted.But is it really? Conspiracy theory exposes a range of predicaments uniquely associated with the epistemic and doxastic issues of institutional credibility. Our epistemology and social and political philosophy violently collide. This collision is real and serious. As we’ll see, these conspiracy theories are unscathed by the traditional objections against them and if true, or even credible possibilities, are devastating to many of our traditional moral projects as philosophers of society and its political/economic institutions.’

p. 91 - ‘A “conspiracy theory” is an explanation of important events that appeals to the intentional deception and manipulation of those involved in, affected by, or witnessing these events. These deceptions/manipulations involve multiple, cooperating players. While there is no contradiction in the phrase “conspiracies of goodness,” the deceptions and manipulations implied by the term “conspiracy theory” are usually thought to express nefarious, even insanely evil, purposes. A total malevolent global conspiracy is the extreme example. Imagine that the “world” as we know it today is an elaborate hoax. A cabal of unaccountable, parasitic power elites virtually unknown to the public controls the economy, politics, popular ideology, and pop culture and so, by causal implication, the lives of the masses.’
(Definition of both a CT and a Malevolent CT.)

p. 92 - ‘Are such conspiracies “really possible”? There’s no denying that we live in a remarkably secretive, hierarchically organized civilization. The major bases of power—national governments and global corporate empires—combine enormous institutional, financial, and technological resources with extensive mechanisms of secrecy, both preventative and punitive. Financial gain, political power, and maniacal ego amplification have always proved strong temptations for unaccountable authorities. Such a civilization is ripe for allegations of organized, society-wide manipulations and deceptions affecting most everyone’s life. It’s no surprise that such allegations are exceedingly common. On the face of things there is a serious prior probability of global conspiracy. With the emergence of a truly global political-economic system, this possibility has never been more sobering.’
(Past instances and warrant.)

p. 93 - ‘There are four primary objections to the rational acceptance of global conspiracy theory per se: unfalsifiability, uncontrollability, an appeal to the trust-worthiness of public institutions of information, and the ever-present accusation of paranoia.’

p. 93 - ‘Falsified evidence is precisely what a conspiracy theory predicts will be produced by governments and other players in ample amounts.’
(Falsifiability)

p. 93 - ‘Some have argued against ambitious conspiracy theory because they believe important conspiracies require too great a unity and stability of purpose among too many people to be feasible.’
(Uncontrollability.)

p. 94 - ‘The loci critical for effective descending control surely are not at the level of “herding cats,” the level of ordinary workers, but instead are highly placed and therefore much more manageable and discrete.’
(Uncontrollability.)

p. 94 - ‘Closely related to the uncontrollability objection, the appeal to trustworthiness of public institutions of information focuses not on the issue of control per se but on the control of information. This is the normal and most substantial objection to global conspiracy theory. Surely governmental investigations, the “free press,” and alert private individuals at large will inevitably encounter the existence of the conspiracy and inevitably and effectively sound the alarm. Thus any truly global malevolent conspiracy will be exposed and eliminated by the agents of goodness and freedom found everywhere. The reason this response is normal is that in the West we have all been deeply indoctrinated in the mythos of the vigilant free press, the benevolent protection of the investigative authorities, and the unstoppable power of the lone crusader for truth. Our press, government, and media taught us this, naturally. But does confidence in this trinity of truth have the kind of rational basis required to undermine effectively the possibility (or even likelihood) of something as potentially dangerous as global conspiracy?’
(Public trust/institutions.)

p. 94-5 - ‘(1) We have little reason to claim positive warrant for our confidence in public institutions of information where critical interests of the dominant powers are at stake, and (2) substantial positive warrant exists to believe that public institutions of information are routinely used to deceive us in the service of these interests. This is the seedbed out of which conspiracy theory grows. Let’s get a better grip on these twin concerns.
‘Our lack of positive warrant for confidence in public institutions of information is reminiscent of a scientist presented with two competing theories of the same phenomenon. Both explain the same gross behavior, both cohere very well with a wide variety of background beliefs and theories (though perhaps not always the same background beliefs and theories), and both predict very much the same future states, at least until an unspecified point in time. Neither is radically more complex in the entities it assumes exist and the relations these hold to one another. The primary difference between the two is in the ratio of the kind of relations assumed to hold. In the trusting background theory, most of these relationships are driven by something like moral and cultural commitments to an open, honest, and democratic civil society with only a small degree of deviant, conspiratorial elements at work. In the distrusting background theory these relationships include many of the former open and honest relationships, but with a formidable amount of fairly routine, systematic descending conspiratorial control based on the financial, political, and ideological advantage to be gained by exercising it. Both background theories lead to very much the same observable state of affairs—our world—if only because it is the nature of a civilization riddled with competent conspiracy to mimic carefully the visible surface of an open and honest one.
‘Positive warrant for some amount of conspiratorial infiltration of public institutions of information is readily available. While a total skepticism about public institutions may be unreasonable, a total skepticism about the current existence of even one fairly involved, widespread, and shocking conspiracy involving an elaborate cover-up/disinformation campaign seems just as unbalanced. Again, in today’s society there is an unavoidable and serious prior probability of active conspiracy. It’s also endemic to the human condition: Cases of marital infidelity often exist in which friends and relatives know but for various reasons (selfish or “compassionate”) conceal the behavior. Multiplayer business betrayals, thieving trickery, and cruel false rumors requiring the cooperation of others are ubiquitous in the private sphere. Hardly any of us will pass through life without encountering this sordid behavior in one form or another. These “amateur” conspiracies can even last a lifetime. I imagine that for every conspiratorial infidelity revealed, another is never discovered, and the perpetrator and his or her co-operatives carry the truth to their graves. Combine this natural and well-developed human capacity with a civilization of vast, intimidating, and “openly secretive” governmental and corporate powers, and the conclusion that conspiratorial groups exist somewhere in the public realm and are busy doing something far reaching and painfully nefarious is almost irresistible. It would be perverse to deny flatly that there are people, high-placed and full of brilliant but cruel cunning, reaping the benefits of a widespread, enduring, and revolting pattern of deception and manipulation right now.’
(Public trust/institutions, past instances and warrant.)

p. 96 - ‘The issue before us is one of degree. A spectrum exists between the trusting and distrusting background theories of our civilization. Reasoned epistemic choice within this spectrum can only advert to empirical facts about the actual degree of conspiracy at work in the multitude of institutional relationships spanning all sectors of political, governmental, and economic enterprise. But getting the real measure of this is something that most all of us are in no reliable position to judge. I suspect that virtually no one is or can be. This is, literally, beyond our ken.’
(Public trust/institutions.)
p. 96-7 - ‘Imagine two competing accounts of the degree of conspiratorial coordination in our society, a trusting and a distrusting one. Self-consistency, coherence with many background beliefs, and thoroughness lend some epistemic force to an account. Let’s grant, as is surely the case, that these two accounts can be similar in this respect. What remains to guide our choice between them is an epistemic evaluation of basic claims. By “basic claims” I mean those claims taken as “observationally given” in the account and not supported solely through additional claims. I imagine “observationally given” here merely means documents, records, and personal interviews. Basic claims address a plethora of factors, including but not limited to the level of private interaction among major corporations and leading political figures (presidents, congressional members, their political party chieftains, etc.), the financial statements of various judges, key witnesses and other players, the kind and amount of personal favors exchanged, and various friendship, family, and sexual linkages among leading sources of corporate and government policy making. We must also include the level of credible coercion at work in a multitude of relationships. Ignoring the logistic nightmare at hand, suppose we can—somehow—adequately gather the relevant mountain of data. Our problem at this point is how do we evaluate these basic claims, upon which our decision rests? Our dilemma is that there are two distinct scenarios between which we must decide: (1) These basic claims are largely filtered and sometimes totally fabricated through deceptive practices put in place by fairly well-developed networks of highly placed conspirators (unified or unconnected) in order to avoid detection by inquiries like our own, or (2) these basic claims are largely accurate, because the level of conspiratorial activity in our society is fairly weak and so conspiratorial control of such information is weak. The issue of degree simply presents itself again. We are left having to assume an answer to the essential issue of how conspiratorial our society is in order to derive a well-justified position on it. In its most rock-bottom premise any public trust approach falls to this point.’
(Warrant, public trust/institutions.)

p. 97 - ‘It’s telling that it’s hard for many of us to imagine anybody of research that would convince us a malevolent global conspiracy was really in place. Perhaps because of a carefully cultivated childhood trust in public authorities many of us are irrationally averse to the idea.’

p. 97 - ‘There is nothing systemic in the revelation of most conspiracies. Rather, good luck almost always plays the leading role.’

p. 97 - ‘The truly competent criminal is not caught and often never suspected. Why should a carefully planned and executed conspiracy be any different?’

p. 98 - ‘Recall the accusation advanced by some that the Holocaust is a hoax. Concerned that admitting the possibility of extreme conspiracy theory undermines most all our historical/ideological commitments, Keeley quotes Robert Anton Wilson: “a conspiracy that can fool us about 6,000,000 deaths can deceive us about anything, and that it takes a great leap of faith for Holocaust Revisionists to believe World War II happened at all, or Franklin Roosevelt did serve as president.” But is this convincing? Not sufficiently. One hoax doesn’t show that all is a hoax, nor does it show that belief in any other historic event requires a “leap of faith.” Serious conspiracies aren’t secretions of the void: they require compelling motives and substantial efforts. Credible motives and means must be proposed on a case-by-case basis. If today we believe extreme conspiracies are impossible then Wilson is right. Our justification for other momentous events is reduced if the Holocaust never happened: To our surprise, the information system can be subverted in amazing ways. But this is only a relative reduction. Epistemic justification isn’t eliminated. Justification still exists, as it always has, on a continuum. Suppose the Holocaust is a hoax. As an eyewitness to the smoldering shell of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City after the blast that destroyed it, I remain in a far better epistemic position concerning the reality of the bombing than someone who watched purported images of this havoc on television. And her belief retains significantly greater epistemic force than that of someone who has merely been told by an acquaintance. Justification for momentous events remains a matter of relative degree, whatever the truth of the Holocaust.’
(Testimony.)

p. 99 - ‘Openness is most effective if the major institutions of political and economic activity are what they appear to be, centers of societal decision making, not counterfeits animated from outside in order to divert our attention from the secretive real centers of control. While the issue of pseudoinstitutions is important, we already have significant justification for believing that the personnel (elected or otherwise) of the U.S. government are frequently the decisive source of U.S. law and national policy and that the officers of major economic establishments like Chase Manhattan Bank are in fact real captains of commerce, personally playing a significant role in the direction of national and global economies. First, there is no need to erect massive, elaborate decoys. Working within the visible power structures appears quite adequate to the task of inflicting conspiratorial control as well as being overall a simpler approach. Moreover, the greater the extent of counterfeit institutions, the greater the difficulty of creating and maintaining their appearance as concentrated sources of influence on world events. Finally, it is precisely because these institutions attract those most ambitious for power that they are likely to be the breeding grounds of ambitious conspiracy. Conspiratorial control will, at any rate, be introduced into society via these institutions, so thorough public access to their workings lets us better evaluate their direction while also reducing the likelihood that ultimate command lies outside them.
‘With these points in mind we can accept that all things remaining equal, (1) the more open a society’s institutions of power, the less initially warranted overarching conspiracy theories are, and (2) given a particular level of openness, the greater the difficulty experienced in keeping a conspiracy theory alive (via ever-expanding claims of falsified evidence, media manipulation, etc.), the less warranted it is, because the conspiracy’s execution would be that much more difficult. While today this may license little confidence it points us in precisely the right direction.’
(I sort of agree but also feel that Basham is downplaying the situation; openness could easily be faked, especially if we have a prior belief in openness that we have been brought up to believe in. Indeed, historically, we might think that the grounds for this belief is unwarranted.)

p. 100 - ‘Belief in the possibility of such conspiracies needn’t be an expression of unreasonable fear. We have seen at length how a rational person can come to accept this possibility, perhaps even its likelihood or eventuality. While the conspiracy theorist’s concerns may easily prove misplaced, there is nothing inherently exaggerated or distorted in them. This is all the more evident in the context of an extremely hierarchical, routinely secretive society like our own. Only the paranoid (or extremely inquisitive) are likely to become conspiracy theorists. But this reveals more about the current complacency of the average citizen than it does about the nature of the conspiracy theorist’s concerns. While the details of her preferred conspiratorial account are frequently speculative, her motivating concern can be arrived at rationally. It may even be rationally compelling.’

p. 100 - ‘In our present civilization I suspect the main source of popular “disbelief” in conspiracy theory has nothing to do with epistemic warrant. It is much more pragmatic: There is nothing you can do. Any number of conspiracies might be worming their way through our world order. Now what? The “get a life” principle kicks in with a vengeance. We immediately dismiss the issue as far beyond our circle of possible knowledge or action.’