All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Brian L. Keeley, Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition!: More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory in JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 34 No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 104–110.

p. 105-6 - ‘I wanted to know whether we could do with our culture’s more extreme, if seductive, conspiracy theories what Hume did with reports of miracles: argue that while they could conceivably be true (it is impossible to say with certainty that historical miracles did not occur), nonetheless such reports are never credible. There is something about the very definition of a miracle that contravenes our justification for believing in it. After exploring a number of possibilities, I conclude that, unlike Hume’s analysis of miracles, no such a priori analysis is available in the case of conspiracy theories. This is the case, in large part, because there are a number of conspiracies, such as those related to Watergate, that are credible. Nevertheless, I suggest that in the end, we do have grounds for rejecting the wackier of conspiracy theories, but on a posteriori grounds (as Basham summarizes well in his article). As time passes and a particular theory is not substantiated by independent evidence, it is either the case that we simply reject the theory, or the scope of the theory must be expanded to explain the lack of confirming evidence (e.g., that various members of the media must be “in” on the conspiracy, hence their lack of investigative interest in the story). Eventually, at some necessarily vague point, the degree of global skepticism required to continue to hold the theory becomes genuinely nihilistic; it can be rejected on the same grounds on which we reject such globally skeptical worries as that the world came into existence only five minutes ago.
‘Jared Diamond, in his Guns, Germs, and Steel(1999, 48–49), offers an argument with a structure that parallels the one I make concerning how the credibility of conspiracy theories erodes over time as corroborating evidence fails to turn up. As he discusses, the date of earliest human occupation of the New World is a matter of scientific debate. The generally accepted date is approximately 11,000 b.c., in spite of the fact that a small number of sites that seem to point to a much earlier date have been discovered. Diamond argues that the main evidence against the earlier date of New World colonization is the ongoing lack of discoveries of subsequent sites despite diligent searching. One can point to a given site as evidence of pre-Clovis3 occupation; but as time has passed, not many additional examples have been found. This casts doubts on the interpretation of the previously discovered data. The nail in the coffin is that on other continents scientists have found many (over one hundred) pre-Clovis sites (using far fewer investigators, by the way).
‘It is generally true that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” but this maxim is misapplied in cases in which evidence is actively sought and is not discovered in spite of its discovery in other parallel situations. As time passes and evidence in favor of a particular conspiracy theory fails to manifest, in spite of the diligent efforts of many and in spite of the discovery of such evidence in other prima facie similar cases, a downward adjustment of that theory’s credibility ought to result.’

p. 106 - ‘One note of clarification before continuing: at several points in his article, Basham suggests that the issue is the “possibility or likelihood” of a given conspiracy theory’s being true. I still feel it is important to keep the metaphysical and epistemic issues separate. The metaphysical issue is a question of truth: is it possible that a given conspiracy theory is true? The very fact that we give conspiracy theories any credence at all reflects our belief in their logical possibility. Even the most extreme malevolent global conspiracies (e.g., that our sensory experiences are being manipulated by Descartes’ evil demon) are logical possibilities. However, this issue is separate from that of the warranted believability of such claims. There is much in the world that is possible but that nonetheless is literally incredible. What makes the issue of conspiracy theories one for practical epistemology is this latter epistemic issue: should we accede to the kinds of conspiratorial thinking Basham describes?’

p. 107 - ‘As Henry Kissinger (1977) famously observed, “Even a paranoid can have enemies.” No, the problem with the accusation of paranoia is that it begs the question. What makes a given paranoid “paranoid” is the “unreasonableness” of her beliefs. This is exactly what is at question here. The diagnosis of paranoia and the rejection of the alleged paranoid’s conspiracy theory are both justified (or undermined) by the same thing: an evaluation of the evidence in favor of the theory. To label a conspiracy theory “paranoid” is merely to restate the claim that it is unwarranted; it is not evidence for rejecting it.’

p. 109 - ‘Second—and this will be my final thought—the historical record cuts both ways. It can be read, as Basham does, as an endorsement of the hypothesis that small groups of individuals secretly control large segments of what we take to be the “free world.” However, it should also be noted that when it comes to committing large-scale evil, secrecy is often largely unnecessary. Six million European Jews, Gypsies, and homosexuals can be rounded up and systematically murdered without a global conspiracy. The “witches” of Salem can be tried and burned to death without a global conspiracy. And as the Monty Python comedy team, quoted in my title, correctly points out, events such as the Spanish Inquisition are entirely unexpected; however, I might add, the individuals that perpetrate such events can be amazingly effective in carrying out the deeds they wish without much recourse to secrecy and conspiracy. If one wishes to be malevolent on a global scale, why waste time and energy maintaining a conspiracy when history shows that one can get away with it in the open?’