All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Pigden, Charles, ‘Popper Revisited, or What Is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?’ in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 25:1 (1995:Mar.) p.3-34

p. 3 - ‘Conspiracy theories are widely deemed to be superstitious. To suggest, for example, that New Zealand’s lurch to the right is due to a conspiracy between leading politicians, the Treasury, and big business is to invite the shaking of heads and pitying looks from sophisticated colleagues. Everybody knows that that is not the way history works. Yet, on the face of it, the evidence points the other way. History is littered with conspiracies, successful and otherwise. The reign of Elizabeth I, for instance, reads like a catalog of conspiracies-the Ridolfi plot, the Throckmorton plot, the Babington plot, and so on-and the queen herself was no stranger to conspiratorial intrigue. So why is it so silly to believe in conspiracies? After all, the rival “theory” often proposed-the cock-up theory of history-presupposes a conspiracy or at least a plan. If I am not trying to do something, I cannot cock it up. In other words, you cannot substitute cock-ups for conspiracies in the explanation events. In many cases, the cock-ups simply are failed conspiracies (think of Watergate), and when they are not, they are failed endeavors of some other kind. (To be fair, the term cock-up is sometimes used to cover the disastrous consequences of a policy of drift and indecision on the part of the powers that be.) The fact that conspiracies and cock-ups are not incompatible should be obvious from the case of criminal conspiracies. If I were charged with a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice, I would not get off just because the judge did not take the bribe, the witnesses could not be intimidated, or the CIA refused to obstruct the FBI. Even those who look down their noses at conspiracy theories often laud the conspiratorial activities of their own particular heroes (although not under that description). Plotting and covert action were both required to win World War 11. To admire Churchill, therefore, is to admire a successful conspirator.’
(Disbelief of current CTs, historic CTs and the Cock-up Theory of History)

p. 5 - ‘Let us define our terms. A conspiracy is a secret plan on the part of a group to influence events partly by covert action. Conspiracies therefore can be either good or bad depending on the purposes, circumstances, and methods used. Conspiracy, as I use it, is not necessarily a pejorative word. However, in a democracy, where politics is supposed to be above board, there is perhaps a presumption (but no more) that conspiracies are morally suspect.’
(CT definition)
p. 6 - ‘”THE CONSPIRACY THEORY:” POPPER’S VERSION
‘Popper’s (1996 [The Open Society and its Enemies]) characterization of “the conspiracy theory of society” is as follows:
‘It is the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed) and who have planned and conspired to bring it about. (p. 94)

‘What the theory claims is not that the explanation of a social phenomenon often consists in the discovery of men or groups who are interested in its occurrence but that it always does. If this is the theory, Popper is right to deny it. It is ridiculous to suppose that every social phenomenon is the product of a conspiracy. But, by the same token, it is a thesis that nobody believes. The denial of the conspiracy theory on this interpretation would be little more than a truism, for it is quite compatible with the denial of the conspiracy theory in this sense that the world should be choc-a-bloc with conspiracies, most of them successful. All that is required is that some phenomena result from other causes.’
(i.e. Popper asserts ‘All As are Bs’ but no one believes that. If pushed they believe ‘Some As are Bs’ and that does not imply ‘All As are Bs.’)

p. 6 - ‘Nor is this all. Popper seems to suggest that, according to the conspiracy theory, the explanation of an event consists solely in the discovery of a group of interested plotters. We do not need to talk about the circumstances that create the opportunities or the mechanisms used to influence affairs; a set of conspirators is all it takes. Again, if this is the conspiracy theory, it is obviously false, for it confers god-like powers on the conspirators. It is as if the simple act of conspiring, irrespective of the social situation or the political, economic, or opinion-making powers of the plotters, can have an impact on history. Again, if this is the conspiracy theory, it is a theory that nobody believes.’
(Context)

p. 6 - ‘If the Elders of Zion were simply a group of poor and otherwise friendless old men who met together in a bar in Brooklyn after unsuccessful careers in the garment industry-well, they could plot all they liked, but nothing of any consequence would be likely to follow.’

p. 7 - ‘A final problem with Popper’s conspiracy theory is this. Does the explanation of an event consist in a group of conspirators who planned to bring about that very event? Are we to understand that (at least when conspiracies are to be cited) what happens is just what the plotters ordered? Apparently yes, for in another formulation of the theory Popper (1972a) writes, “It is the view that whatever happens in society . . . are the results of direct design by some powerful individuals or groups” (p. 341). If so, the conspiracy theory is committed to the view that history is to be explained in terms of successful conspiracies. It is not just that sometimes an event X is partly to be explained by a conspiracy; it must be explained by a conspiracy to bring about event X! In which case, the conspiracy theory is indeed incompatible with the cock-up theory, for a cock-up is a situation in which an event X is explained by a plan (or perhaps a conspiracy) to bring about Y that somehow goes astray.’
(Cock-up Theory of History and the False Dilemma (indeed, this is a good summary of the issue))

p. 8 - ‘So, again, we are left with a reading of the conspiracy theory that damns it to absurdity but that renders its denial uninteresting. Moreover, its falsehood is quite compatible with what I want to assert. The claim that (when conspiracies are to be cited) events cannot always be explained in terms of successful conspiracies does not entail that many events cannot be explained by conspiracies, successful and otherwise.’
p. 9 - ‘Perhaps there is some sort of presumption against conspiracy theories. Perhaps conspiracies are rare or relatively impotent so that they do not have much impact on history. Indeed, in Conjectures and Refutations (Popper 1972a, 342), Popper asserts precisely this: “They [that is, conspiracies] are not very frequent and do not change the character of social life.” If conspiracies were to cease, “we would still be faced with fundamentally the same problems which have always faced us.”’

p. 9 - ‘I have claimed that conspiracies, successful and otherwise, often play a part in history (although their influence depends on the historical situation and the powers at the disposal of the conspirators). Who would oppose such a platitude? Perhaps nobody would explicitly, but the starting point of this article is that a lot of people deny it implicitly.’
(On disbelief in current CTs)

p. 11 - Pigden calls the intermediate theory between the CT explanation and the Cock-up Theory of History the Drift Theory (this might be Lord Hervey’s term, actually). Pure Drift also gets used as a term for the Cock-up Theory of History.

p. 12 - ‘The fact (or the alleged fact) that “few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy” (Popper 1966 [Open Soecity], p. 95, italics added). Popper, like many of his vulgar imitators, is a believer in the cock-up theory of history. The reason conspiracy theories are false is that conspiracies usually fail. But why is this supposed to disprove the conspiracy theory? (After all, as I have already argued, a cock-up presupposes a conspiracy or at least a plan.) Because the conspiracy theory involves the claim that historical phenomena are the products of successful conspiracies.’

p. 12-3 - ‘But this means that the revised claim suggested by Popper’s argument is very different from the vulgar version put about by conspiratorial politicians. It is quite compatible with the revised thesis that the world should be positively bursting with conspiracies and that many, if not most, historical phenomena are the partial products of conspiratorial activity, so long as these conspiracies are not ultimately successful [in bringing about their aims].’
p. 13 - ‘My claim is that conspiracies, successful and otherwise, are often among the causes of historical events. By this I mean to imply that successful (or perhaps partially successful) conspiracies are not unheard of. The fact that event X occurred is not prima facie evidence that nobody conspired to bring it about, and so my version of the conspiracy theory is incompatible with the revised thesis suggested by Popper’s argument.’
p. 13 - ‘But, unfortunately for Popper’s followers, the revised thesis does not follow from his premise, for the fact-if it is a fact-that conspirators by and large do not ultimately succeed does not imply that they cannot chalk up quite a number of successes along the way.’
(i.e. long term goal nil, short term one; tactics vs. strategy; win the battles, lose the war.)

p. 14-3 - ‘Popper might object that they [CTs] do not succeed in the long run as subsequent events do not turn out the way the conspirators planned. I have three replies to this.
‘1. By putting off the success of a conspiracy into the long run in which we are all dead, this maneuver renders what ought to be an empirical thesis (”Conspirators seldom consummate their conspiracies”) close to irrefutable. for however successful a conspiracy may be, it is always possible that it will end in tears (from the conspirators’ point of view, of course). This vague appeal to the long term is therefore contrary to Popperian method. (It is analogous to the Marxian maneuver of saving Marx from refutation by putting off the predicted collapse of capitalism into an indefinite future.) Worse, if the standards for consummation are set too high, the thesis “conspirators seldom consummate their conspiracies” becomes true but trivial. If a conspiracy counts as unconsurnmated whenever things happen afterward that the conspirators do not like, or would not have approved of, then indeed it will be true that conspirators seldom (or even never) consummate their conspiracies. But this will not deter a rational person from entering into a conspiracy in the hopes of some less demanding kind of success. No doubt, Jefferson would have disapproved of the Los Angeles riots. This does not mean that the American Revolution was a failure. Indeed, the degree of success enjoyed by Jefferson and his confederates is a consummation devoutly to be wished.
‘2. Even if we concede that conspirators seldom consummate their conspiracies (where consummation is a relatively long-term affair), this does not suggest that individual conspiracy theories are false. To revert to an earlier example, I am inclined to believe that New Zealand’s lurch to the right was due to a loose conspiracy among leading politicians, the Treasury, and big business. Suppose the opposition Alliance comes to power and New Zealand lurches back to the left, leaving the schemes of the alleged conspirators unconsummated. This would in no way disprove the existence of the initial conspiracy. So, far from a tendency to long-term failure telling against conspiracy theories, it is often when things begin to come unstuck that the existence of conspiracies becomes evident. (Again, think of Watergate.)
‘3. So long as we do not set our sights too high, we do not have to look too far for conspiracies that have succeeded in the long term. I have mentioned the American Revolution already.’

p. 16-21 - Critique of Popper’s Third World theory of Historical Explanation.

p. 20 - Outside context effects outcomes in re the success of CTs.

p. 22-3 - ‘Sometimes what Popper seems to be saying is that large-scale historical disasters-war and famine, depression and mass unemployment-are not the results of conspiracy. Here we must distinguish between two claims: (1) that war, famine, depression, and unemployment are not caused or made worse by conspiracies and (2) that they are not the products of deliberate conspiracy-that is, even if a conspiracy is responsible, war/ famine, and unemployment are not what the plotters conspired to bring about. Both claims are false. War, famine, and unemployment can be caused (or partially caused) by conspiracy and, in some cases, war or famine is what the plotters had in mind.’
p. 24 - ‘Another fallback position is what might be called conspiratorial Occamism. Conspiracies do occur, and some of them even succeed. On occasion, they even have major impacts. However, Occam dictates that we should be very cautious in positing conspiracies. Occam’s Razor is the general principle that, in choosing between hypotheses, the simplest is (usually) the best. Conspiracies tend to be complex affairs. People have to get together to agree on a plan, mobilize resources, and maintain a veil of secrecy. All this takes some doing, and so conspiracy theories will usually be more complex than their rivals and hence should be rejected.
‘Not so, for the nonconspiracy theories may be more complex. They may require an elaborate and unlikely sequence of coincidences or complicated social mechanisms that duplicate the appearance of conspiracy.’
(Occam’s Razor)
p. 28 - ‘If you are in fact a conspirator, especially if you are engaged in a conspiracy of which the public would disapprove, it is obviously useful to subscribe to the theory that there are no such things, but I think there is a little more to it than that. Sometimes the skepticism is sincere even when the skeptic is an active conspirator. Some conspirators are taken in by an enthymeme: “Conspiracies are bad, therefore I am not a conspirator.” But conspiracies are not always bad, and when they are it is the unspoken premise (”I do not do bad things”) that is at fault. The real reason for the widespread self-deception is that it is easy to slip into a conspiracy without really noticing. This is partly because people have an unduly theatrical conception of conspiracy. They think that conspiracy requires oaths, passwords, secret codes, and other such exotic paraphernalia and that it is the province of spies and Mafiosi. But conspiracy can be a matter of a few words, a phone call, a look, or a cozy chat between old friends.’
(Why people and conspirators dismiss CTs)