On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony, Paul Faulkner
Faulkner, P. (2002), ‘On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony’, Synthese 131, 353-370.
p. 354 - Dummett (and Reid) on the prima facie claim to the reasonableness of Testimony.
‘This argument to the conclusion that credulity is justified may be set out somewhat as follows.
(1) We largely lack reasons—in the sense of propositions believed—for accepting testimony.
(2) In those cases where we do have reasons, these reasons are usually insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs.
(3)Therefore, if our practice of accepting testimony without reason were not justified, few of our testimonial beliefs would be justified.
(4) Many of our testimonial beliefs are justified.
(5) Therefore, we must be justified, other things being equal, in accepting testimony without reason, that is, credulously.’
Descriptive epistemological claim (R): we usually have reasons—in the sense of propositions believed—for accepting testimony (used against (1)).
Evidence claim (E): our reasons for accepting testimony can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form (used against (2)).
p. 355 – Three things: (R) does not state nor imply that acceptance is inferential. (R) and (E) involve an important distinction between reasons for a belief and evidence for a belief. (R) and (E) are not claims about what justifies a testimonial belief.
Testimony, like perception, generates immediate and non-inferential beliefs.
We can think of something as being evidence for a belief whilst not taking it to be a true proposition.
p. 356 – Different types of testimony; different reactions to them.
p. 357 – Developmental view.
p. 358 – Defeaters to testimony.
p. 359 – List of circumstantial features we might take onboard when judging when to accept testimony [although, of course, a nervous, speaker might testify better than a calm, practiced liar].
Can distinguish three classes of testimony to an audience: accepted testimony, rejected testimony and testimony on which judgement was suspended.
p. 362 – Coherence (couched in probabilistic terms).
p. 363-4 – Either runs an inductive or reliabilist line in re our prior presumptions about testimony.
p. 365 – FAE
p. 366 – Is arguing that credulity is a weakness, not an epistemic default.
