Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy, Elizabeth Fricker
Fricker, E. (2006),Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy, in Jennifer Lackey & Ernst Sosa, ed.,’The Epistemology of Testimony’, Oxford University Press, , pp. 225-250.
p. 226 – Developmental view.
p. 227 – Conceptual categorisation depends on prior testimony and this is essential for current perceptions, et al.
p. 231 – ‘Testimony Deferential Acceptance Principle (TDAP 1): For one properly to accept that P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P—her word that P—requires that she be epistemically well enough placed with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form a conscious belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and that she be better epistemically placed with respect to P then oneself; and that one recognize these things to be so.’
Only a necessary, not sufficient, condition.
p. 232 – ‘TDAP 2: One properly accepts that P on the basis of trust in another’s testimony that P—her word that P—just if she speaks sincerely, and she is epistemically well enough placed with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form a conscious belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and she is better epistemically placed with respect to P then oneself; and one recognizes all these things to be so; and one is not aware of significant contrary testimony regarding P.’
Claims it is not rational to unquestioningly accept testimony. Epistemic autonomy, blah blah blah.
p. 233 – Expert condition:
‘S is an expert about P relative to H at t just if at t, S is epistemically well enough placed with respect to P so that were she to have, or make a judgement to form a conscious belief regarding whether P, her belief would almost certainly be knowledge; and she is better epistemically placed than H to determine whether P.’
p. 234 – Can be an expert by natural ability.
p. 235 – Can be an expert via training…
p. 236 – ‘We may thus conjecture that: Strong Deference is appropriate only when the other has a superior expertise—an intrinsic epistemic power—to me.’
Weak deference is appropriate when expertise is only contingent.
p. 237 – We can judge judgements without there being an objective standard.
p. 240 – ‘Knowledge can be passed on in this manner through many links in a chain of trusted testimony. But the regress must stop eventually with someone who knows that P not from trust in testimony. The following axiom holds:
T: If H knows that P through being told that P and trusting the teller there is or was someone who knows that P in some other way—not in virtue of having been told that P and trusting the teller.’
p. 241 – By taking P to be known I am rationally committed to the claim that there is someone who knows P without having been told that P [Actually, could there be an example of a belief that only exists in testimony; certainly there must be a belief that could be separated into non-testimonially justified ‘bits’ but as a belief exists solely on testimonial support...].
p. 242 – Uses folk psychology (she is fond of this kind of move, it seems) to judge sincerity, et al. Is folk psychology good or is it a little like folk physics?
