Testimony and intellectual autonomy, C. A. J. Coady
Coady, C. A. J. (2002), ‘Testimony and intellectual autonomy’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33, 355-372.
p. 359 – Summary of Goldman: consequentialist (knowledge as justified belief) and an instrumentalist about institutions.
p. 361 – Virtue epistemology.
p. 361 – Having characterised Goldman’s view as consequentialist he then critiques him on ethical grounds, but is Goldman’s analogy with consequentialism meant to be taken this strictly?
p. 363 – Goldman’s three virtues of intellectual autonomy. Independence (which doesn’t seem like a virtue), Self-creation (which could be interpreted as a virtue) and Integrity (which does seem like a virtue).
p. 364 – Critiques gossip, et al (dependence, essentially), but Coady, I think, would say that dependence could be a virtue because dependence can be truth maximising.
p. 368 – Wonders why Goldman doesn’t bring up the notion of interpretation, but perhaps Goldman doesn’t discuss interpretation because, like dependence, this comes out of knowledge acquisition in a social sense. Indeed, Goldman could, plausibly I think, claim that interpretation comes out of questions of interest.
