The Epistemology of Testimony, Duncan Pritchard
Pritchard, D. (2004), ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Philosophical Issues 14, 326-348.
p. 327 – Runs a line on testimony-based beliefs and seems to argue that perception trumps testimony. However, couldn’t you have a situation where Mary knows the house is on fire because John told her that it was and her then seeing the fire confirms but doesn’t further justify the claim. She knew because John told her, in the same way that I know an awful lot about science without having performed all that many experiments.
p. 328 – Defines Global Reductionism
Calls anti-reductionism ‘Credulism.’
p. 331 – Defines Local Reductionism.
Developmental view.
p. 332 – Assertion Model.
p. 333 – Mixed/Hybrid Model – restricted assertion model where we have some TBB beliefs which are justified and use these to root the other TBBs.
p. 334 – Defeater-defeater view; having no grounds to doubt testimony.
p. 337 – Critiques the developmental model on intuitionist lines; a child and an adult can hear the same testimony and one is justified in accepting it and the other is not.
p. 339 – Reply to above; children are blameless in accepting the testimony whilst adults are not.
p. 340 – Externalist credulism fares better than internalist credulism because as long as I form the belief the right way then my lack of an independent reflective reason for believing ‘that p’ is of no concern.
