All Embracing But Underwhelming…

Fricker, E. (1987), ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soceity Supplementary Volume LXI, 57-106.

p. 57 – Knowledge is spread through language use.

p. 58 – Anti-reliablist in re testimony. Arguing for the following claim:

‘(T) The epistemology of testimony yielded by a certain Justificationist conception of knowledge is superior to that yielded by any version of Reliabilism.’

Fricker is dealing with JB in this regard and contrasts this to reliable belief.

p. 59 – Argues for a Justificationist approach to testimony with reference to considerations about the essential nature of language; this will highlight what knowledge is.

p. 62 – Fricker feels that a reliabilist theory (of testimony) does not take into account reflection, et al, which is, she claims, a needed ability of an agent to know something.

p. 63-4 – The Unity Constraint: An abstract conception that there is a single thing called ‘Knowledge’ that can be achieved in a variety of ways. We can have different epistemologies as long as they derive from the Unity Constraint.

p. 65-6 – ‘We may count a way of acquisition of beliefs W was an epistemic link, on our favoured justificationist theory, if the following two conditions hold:

I. There is a type Jw of justification for beliefs associated with W in our defined sense.

II. At least sometimes when a subject has acquired a belief b through W he will, at least in part as a consequence of this process, be in the position to know the premises of a justification of the type Jw, and thus to offer this justification in defence of b.’

p. 66-7 – Seeing is a primary epistemic link whilst Testimony is only secondary.

Whilst Seeing grants us Knowledge Testimony needs further (non-testimonial) support to count as justifying a belief as Knowledge.

p. 68-9 – Fricker takes a broad conception of what counts as Testimony.

‘A speaker, believing that P, and wishing to communicate this belief, makes an utterance which constitutes his asserting that P; his audience, a hearer, observing and understanding it—that is to say, recognising it as the speech act that it is—as a result comes also to believe that P.’

p. 72 – Makes use of commonsense semantics (CSS) (i.e. plays on our intuitions about language).

p. 73 – The nature of the link of testimony in CSS:

‘(A) S asserted that P at t and S was sincere, and was competent at t with respect to P→P.

where S is competent with respect to P at t=df· at t, S believes P→P.’

p. 73 – The Role of Trust in knowledge transmission via testimony.

p. 74 – Hearing a speech act that p creates an unmediated belief about p.

A says p. B hears ‘that p’ but forms the belief at the second order:

A: “that p”
B: “A has said ‘that p’” (B infers what A has said – First Order)
B: Forms belief ‘that p’ (Second Order)

p. 75 – Admits that we have a long experience of false testimony to fall back upon to question the prima face case.

p. 78 – The Reliabilist account (in re Testimony) ignores the reflective need of a knower to consider testimonial transmission. It is only fortuitous to a reliabilist that testimonial transmission is good.

p. 81 – Humans are reflective language users.

‘…our account of knowledge should have the consequence that only those who are masters of CSS are in a position to gain knowledge through observing the utterances of others; through hearing them testify as to how things are in the world in some respect.
‘This argument tells in a strong form against any reliabilist theory whose cut-off point is in fact lower: which has the consequence that pickers-up of beliefs from others’ utterances could be gaining knowledge, despite lacking any grasp of CSS.’